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The euro area sovereign debt crisis, which was the main source of concern regarding mac-
roeconomic policy implementation in the area, was the outcome of a series of closely in-
terlinked factors. The financial crisis had seen uncertainty and nervousness surge, restrict-
ing the channels of funding for the countries that had recently increased their level of debt. 
Further, there was a generalised deterioration in fiscal positions in most countries, giving 
rise to an unprecedented increase in public-sector short-term net borrowing. Against a 
background of financial instability, this prompted greater investor sensitivity to the source 
of the fiscal imbalances that had built up. As a result, these imbalances began to be 
viewed as potentially unsustainable in some countries (see Chart 2.1).
These factors were shared by other economies, such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Japan, but the crisis became particularly virulent in the euro area. The short-
comings in euro area governance proved particularly problematic in light of the macroeco-
nomic and fiscal divergences that had arisen, which heightened uncertainty and the lack 
of confidence in the countries with the biggest imbalances. Moreover, the high financial 
integration among the euro area countries may have been conducive to the markets per-
ceiving cross-country contagion as a possibility.
The sovereign debt crisis began in Greece and subsequently spread to Ireland and Portu-
gal. Other countries were also affected by the contagion, as a result – to differing degrees 
in each case – of doubts over their growth prospects, uncertainty about the costs of re-
structuring their banking systems and the swift rise seen in their budget deficits and public 
debt, as described in Chapters 1 and 4 of this Report.
The first pre-requisite for overcoming the euro area sovereign crisis is the follow-through 
of a fiscal consolidation process, embarked upon already in some countries in 2010, that 
leads to firm foundations being set in place to reduce the deficit and control debt in the 
medium and long run, and to the entrenchment of the macroeconomic stability needed to 
promote economic growth. Equally important for dispelling market doubts is the applica-
tion of structural reforms that help provide for the recovery in potential growth and the 
conclusion of the restructuring of financial systems. But such action will not suffice if, as 
well, the euro area’s governance shortcomings that have emerged virulently as the sover-
eign debt crisis has unfolded are not redressed.
This chapter focuses singularly on analysing the fiscal consolidation challenges that the 
sovereign debt crisis has posed for Spanish economic policy.1 First, changes in the fiscal 
position during the crisis in Spain are described. These illustrate how, despite the sur-
pluses in the previous phase, the fiscal space available to pursue expansionary fiscal pol-
icies was limited, and they also reveal the essentially structural nature of the fiscal imbal-
ance built up. Next, debt dynamics are analysed, highlighting the role that economic 
growth potential and the cost of financing play in the sustainability of public finances. That 
primarily helps clarify why the swift increase in the fiscal deficit resulted in strong debt 
market tensions, and, secondly, it allows conclusions to be drawn on how the fiscal adjust-
1 Introduction
In 2010 the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis was the 
fundamental economic event, 
centred on some of the 
peripheral countries
The seriousness of the 
situation requires a resolute 
economic policy response on 
several fronts
1  With reference to Spain, the recovery in potential growth was the central theme of Chapter 2 in the 2009 Annual 
Report. Resolving the shortcomings of policy coordination in the euro area and the financial system restructuring 
process are addressed in other chapters in this report.
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BUDGET BALANCES AND PUBLIC DEBT COMPARED ACROSS DIFFERENT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES CHART 2.1 
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ment must be in terms of magnitude, timing and interaction with other policies. Finally, the 
changes that should be made to the institutional framework and to public spending and 
revenue policies to ensure that the fiscal adjustment is successful are detailed.
In late 2007 Spain had a fiscal surplus of close to 2% and a public debt/GDP ratio of 36%, 
compared with –0.7% and 66%, respectively, in the euro area as a whole (see Chart 2.1). 
However, beneath this healthy position lay some worrying public revenue and spending 
dynamics. Indeed, of the total reduction in the deficit recorded between 1995 and 2007 
(8.4 pp of GDP), almost 5 pp are attributable to the business cycle and to the decline in the 
interest burden, associated above all with the reduction in interest rates. The rest of the 
adjustment was due to an exceptional increase in tax revenue – with a significant tempo-
rary component – linked largely to the excessive real estate expansion, which more than 
offset the reduction in revenue of approximately 3 pp of GDP arising from discretionary 
changes in the tax system (see Chart 2.2).2
Primary public expenditure (excluding interest payments on public debt), net of unemploy-
ment benefits, grew at an annual rate of more than 7%, above trend economic growth. 
That confirms its procyclical behaviour, something common also to other developed coun-
tries.3 Of note was the growth of spending managed by regional and local government, 
which at no point in the expansionary phase attained a balanced budget, despite the high 
increases in tax revenue. Deficiencies in the budgetary framework contributed to this, a 
matter which is dealt with in greater detail in section 4.
2  The causes of the 
fiscal deterioration
At the start of the crisis the 
fiscal situation was favourable, 
albeit thanks to extraordinary 
revenue and worrying 
expenditure dynamics...
2  See F. de Castro, Á. Estrada, P. Hernández de Cos and F. Martí (2008), “Una aproximación al componente tran-
sitorio del saldo público en España”, Boletín Económico, June, Banco de España.
3  See P. R. Lane, (2003), “The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: evidence from the OECD”, Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 87, pp. 2661-2675, and A. Lamo, J. J. Pérez and L. Schuknecht (2007), The cyclicality of consumption, 
wages and employment of the public sector in the euro area, Working Paper No. 757, European Central Bank.
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The crisis revealed the latent risks in the public finances situation and highlighted the little 
leeway available to pursue countercyclical policies. During the economic crisis, the budg-
et deficit rose by more than 13 pp to a peak of 11.1% of GDP at end-2009 (see Chart 2.1). 
Contributing to the deterioration from 2007 to 2009 was the adverse trend of the business 
cycle by around 2.5 pp of GDP, whereas close to 4 pp of GDP were associated with the 
disappearance during the crisis of the extraordinary revenue previously raised (see Chart 2.2). 
in addition, the measures applied in an attempt to alleviate the effects of the crisis amount-
ed to 3.3 pp of GDP, although more than half of this effect was of a temporary nature. The 
rest of the increase in the deficit arises from trend growth in expenditure outpacing that of 
the economy. The rise in the deficit would, therefore, have an eminently structural compo-
nent, meaning that the cyclically adjusted deficit exceeded 10% of GDP in 2009 and stood 
at 8.3% of GDP in 2010.
Public debt amounted to 60.1% of GDP in 2010, almost 24 pp above its level in 2007, but 
still more than 20 pp below the average for the euro area. This increase in debt arose, 
above all, as a result of the rise in the budget deficit. The impact of the aid to the financial 
sector, which exceeded 5 pp of GDP in the euro area between 2008 and 2010, amounted 
to around only 2 pp of GDP in Spain’s case.
In addition to the contagion generated by the Greek and Irish crises and to the worsening 
fiscal situation in our country, other idiosyncratic factors played a crucial role in spreading 
the sovereign debt crisis to Spain. Specifically, along with the adverse effects of the eco-
nomic crisis on the Spanish economy’s level of potential output, according to various es-
timates the growth of this variable in the medium term is also expected to fall by somewhat 
more than 1 pp, dipping from 3% to a rate below 2%.4 On the evidence available, this 
factor is estimated to have played a relevant role in the widening of Spain’s spreads.5 Mar-
ket doubts also influenced the situation of the financial system, which in other countries 
had acted as an exacerbating factor of the fiscal situation, in such a way that the strong 
interrelatedness of macroeconomic, fiscal and financial problems has been particularly 
significant during the current crisis.
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy depend closely on expectations about the 
stability of the public debt/GDP ratio. The dynamics of this ratio hinge, in turn, on 
both the fiscal position, measured by the primary fiscal deficit as a percentage of 
GDP (the public deficit, excluding the interest on public debt), and on macroeco-
nomic developments, via the impact of the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP 
growth rate. The level to which the debt ratio tends is given, in short, by the ratio of 
the primary deficit, in units of GDP, to the difference between the growth rate of 
nominal GDP and the nominal interest rate. By way of example, this means that, with 
a nominal growth rate of 4% and nominal interest rate of 3%, it would be necessary 
to permanently reduce the primary deficit to 0.6% of GDP to stabilise the debt ratio 
at 60%.
Chart 2.3 plots the course of the public debt/GDP ratio over the coming years under 
specific assumptions of budget deficit, interest rates and growth rate. Specifically, on 
the estimates available, the structural fiscal deficit stood at around 8% at end-2010. 
... whereupon the crisis 
prompted a rapid deterioration 
in the budget deficit and 
revealed the size of its 
structural component
Compounding the fiscal 
deterioration were doubts over 
the growth capacity of our 
economy and over the cost of 
restructuring the financial 
system
3  The scale of the fiscal 
adjustment
The fiscal adjustment needed 
is considerable...
4  See P. Hernández de Cos, M. Izquierdo and A. Urtasun (2011), Una estimación del crecimiento potencial de la 
economía española, mimeo.
5  See V. Echevarría, L. Fernández-Caballero and J. J. Pérez (2011), A note on the role of expectations on growth, 
public deficit and public debt in the determination of sovereign bond spreads: two case studies, mimeo, Banco 
de España.
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With this starting point and the growth scenario to 2012 included in the Banco de Es-
paña Projections Report6, if the output gap is assumed to close in 2015, the stabilising 
of public debt at around 70% of GDP that year would require an adjustment in the cycli-
cally adjusted primary balance of more than 8 pp of GDP between 2010 and 2015, 
which is what is simulated in Chart 2.3. That would require strict compliance with the 
commitments undertaken to reduce the budget deficit to 2013 and, subsequently, a 
further reduction, until attaining a balanced budget. Given the budget outturn figures 
for 2010, almost half of this adjustment would have to be made by regional and local 
government.
Compliance with European commitments will further require resuming at a later date a 
level of public debt below 60% of GDP. Under the assumption of a zero contribution to the 
change in debt of the differential between GDP growth and the implicit interest rate on 
debt7, attaining a public debt/GDP ratio of 60% in 2020 would mean that, after achieving 
a balanced budget, for example in 2015, it would be necessary to run a primary surplus of 
around 2.5% of GDP to 2020 (Chart 2.3).
If interest rates were higher or economic growth lower, the fiscal adjustment needed would 
be even greater. Specifically, if the growth rate were 1 pp lower throughout the period 
2011-2020 and there were no additional fiscal adjustment, the rate of public indebtedness 
in 2015 would be 10 pp higher and amount to 85% of GDP in 2020. In this scenario, the 
adjustment of the average structural balance between 2010 and 2020 to place public debt 
at 60% in 2020 would be 1.7 pp of GDP8, compared with around 0.8 pp in the scenario 
considered in Chart 2.3. and this without having regard to the effort needed to withstand 
the impact of population ageing on public finances.
... and would be even greater 
under harsher scenarios
6  Published in the Banco de España April 2011 Economic Bullletin.
7  By way of reference, the difference between GDP growth and the implied interest rate on debt in the period 2000-
2010 provided for an annual average reduction in the debt/GDP ratio of around 0.5 pp of GDP.
8  This is a mechanical calculation that does not take into account the potential interaction between those variables 
subject to the simulation that remain exogenous.
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It is also important to bear in mind that interest rates and the potential growth of the 
economy depend on debt dynamics. In particular, the higher the level of debt and its at-
tendant growth rate, the higher the interest rate at which such debt will have to be financed 
and the lower potential growth will be. The estimates available9 show that an increase of 
10 pp of GDP in the debt ratio gives rise to an increase of 50 bp in long-term interest rates 
and a reduction in real per capita GDP growth of 0.15 pp per year.10 These effects may, 
moreover, be greater if specific levels of debt are exceeded. A sharp reduction in the 
budget deficit and the stabilising of debt would therefore have a significant effect on the 
interest rates on debt and long-term growth, facilitating their sustainability.
In the short run, the impact of the budget deficit on the growth rate depends on a very 
broad set of conditions, such as its composition, the starting levels of debt, the behaviour 
of monetary policy and the exchange rate regime.11 A high budget deficit is not always a 
stimulus to economic activity; indeed, it may prove contractionary if it gives rise to an in-
crease in expectations about future interest rates, which is more likely the greater the debt 
ratio. And the habitually contractionary effects of a reduction in the deficit may be miti-
gated if the consolidation manages to improve confidence and, therefore, to boost private 
consumption and investment, which appears to be more likely in the case of fiscal con-
solidations undertaken at the end of a recession and by means of cuts in government 
consumption.12
Consequently, a timely and well-designed fiscal adjustment may improve growth expecta-
tions, contributing, given a specific primary deficit, to the swifter stabilisation of public 
debt at a less high level. For example, a primary deficit sustained over the long run at 1.2% 
of GDP would be compatible with a debt ratio of 60% if the difference between the growth 
rate and the interest rate were 2 pp.
Given the variables that influence public debt dynamics, the fiscal adjustment strategy 
should take into account not only the course of economic activity and the size of the fiscal 
multipliers, but also the costs of delaying consolidation in terms of risks to credibility and 
the impact on interest rates and agents’ confidence.
Indeed, although the sluggishness of the recovery may have worked in favour of a gradual 
consolidation strategy, the extreme tension conveyed to the debt markets (see Chart 2.4) 
made it vital to bring forward the fiscal adjustment by as much as possible, to gain credi-
bility and to reduce the financing costs of public and private debt alike, given the high 
correlation between the cost of both.
As regards its composition, the fiscal adjustment may be made through various combina-
tions of tax changes and public spending cuts, with different effects not only of a macro-
economic nature in the short run, but also in terms of likelihood of success. Further, the 
presence of factors that delay and hamper the recovery and long-term growth means that 
it is most important that the composition of the adjustment should be as conducive as 
possible to growth.
In certain circumstances, the 
contractionary effects that the 
fiscal adjustment may exert in 
the short run can be mitigated
For this to be so, it is crucial 
that most of the adjustment 
should be brought forward in 
time...
... and focus on public 
spending
  9  See International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor, May 2010 and November 2009.
10  See C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff (2009), “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”, American Economic Review, 99 (2), 
pp. 466-472.
11  For an overview of these results, see Chapter 3 of the International Monetary Fund (2010), World Economic 
Outlook, October.
12  See P. Hernández de Cos and E. Moral Benito (2011), Endogenous Fiscal Consolidations, Working Paper no. 
1102, Banco de España.
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In this respect, the outcome of simulations of different fiscal adjustment strategies based 
on a calibrated macroeconomic model for the Spanish economy are illustrative (see Table 2.1)13. 
These should not, however, be interpreted as normative proposals, since the adjustment 
measures needed are contingent upon the nature of the problems of each conjunctural 
situation. The specific recommendations for the fiscal adjustment strategy in the current 
circumstances of the Spanish economy are addressed in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. According to the simulation exercises, a fiscal adjustment based on cuts in public 
investment would, in principle, exert negative effects on growth in the long run if the plans 
incorporated capital productivity similar to that observed in recent decades. In the present 
situation, however, it should be borne in mind that the return on public investments in in-
frastructure may have been drastically cut, following the period of sharp growth in recent 
years. In any event, it is the reduction in public-sector employees’ compensation (wages 
and public-sector employment) that has greater positive effects on GDP in the long term, 
which are also positive in the short term in the case of wages, provided that the public 
sector wage adjustment passes through to the private sector. On the revenue side, indirect 
tax, although it has very limited negative effects in the short term, positively affects both 
13  For a more detailed analysis of these results, see P. Hernández de Cos and C. Thomas (2011), Los efectos de 
la consolidación fiscal sobre el crecimiento a partir de un modelo macroeconométrico, mimeo.
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GDP and employment in the long run if the rise in such tax allows a reduction in other less 
efficient taxes.
The evidence suggests an association between the course of public revenue and public 
spending and that a larger public sector gives rise to a greater deficit bias14; accordingly, 
public spending cuts are more readily sustainable over time and allow the deficit to be 
reduced to a greater extent and more permanently than commensurate increases in reve-
nue. Taking a longer view, it is also desirable that the fiscal adjustment should be compat-
ible with a restructuring of public finances in which those items with positive effects on 
productivity and potential growth, such as spending on education and R+D+I, gain in 
weight as a proportion of total public spending. 
Membership of a monetary union attributes a more active stabilising role to fiscal policy, 
insofar as monetary policy is geared to price stability in the area as a whole. But, as 
clearly highlighted during the crisis, for it to play this role it is necessary to have an exten-
sive fiscal buffer, building up surpluses during cyclical upturns and reducing the public 
debt/GDP ratio significantly. From this perspective, fiscal consolidation is also very impor-
tant for gaining room for manoeuvre in the face of potential future shocks. The new frame-
work for the working of the European Monetary Union, in which the mechanisms for the 
surveillance and correction of fiscal imbalances will take on greater importance, makes the 
reinforcement of fiscal discipline necessary.
In accordance with the latest Stability Programme Update for Spain unveiled on 29 April 
2011, the consolidation strategy defined by the government means that more than 70% of 
the primary structural adjustment required to 2013 will be concentrated in 2010 and 2011. 
This consolidation strategy is 
particularly appropriate if the 
additional consequences of 
EMU membership are taken 
into account
The fiscal adjustment strategy 
defined by the government is, 
broadly, in line with these criteria
14  See F. de Castro, J.M. González-Páramo and P. Hernández de Cos (2004), “Fiscal consolidation in Spain: dy-
namic interdependence of public spending and revenues”, Investigaciones Económicas, vol. XXVIII.
Year 1 (b) Long term (b) (c)
Initial change 
in the 
instrument
GDP Employment GDP Employment GDP Employment
Taxes on 
wages pp.
REVENUE
Taxes on consumption 1.75 pp -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.8 -3.5
Taxes on wages 2.18 pp -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.6
Corporate income tax 11.83 pp -0.3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 -2.6 -0.4 -2.1
EXPENDITURE
Net purchases -13.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 0.5 -3.2
Public investment -28.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 0.1 -2.5
Public wages -13.5 0.4 0.7 1.8 2.5 3.8 4.2 -7.2
Public employment -13.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 -1.0 1.1 0.2 -4.0
Year 4 (b)
SIMULATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF PERMANENT ADJUSTMENTS IN REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE ON GDP 
AND EMPLOYMENT 
TABLE 2.1 
SOURCES: Banco de España, FiMod model simulation (Stähler, Nikolai and Thomas, Carlos,  2011, “FiMod – A DSGE Model for Fiscal Policy Simulations”, 
Banco de España Working Paper No. 1110). 
a Each change entails an initial improvement of 1 pp in the general government primary surplus. 
b All variables expressed as a percentage change relative to the base scenario, except where a different notation is indicated.
c In the long run, it is assumed the jscal authority uses the saving on interest payments on public debt brought about through the initial jscal consolidation to reduce 
taxes on wage income. 
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Further, in the two years spanning 2010-2011, 60% of the adjustment already made or 
approved resides on the control of public spending, meaning that government consump-
tion and public investment would decline by 1.5 pp of GDP (with a 0.7 pp contribution by 
employee compensation), and other spending and subsidies would decline by around 1 pp 
of GDP. The composition of the fiscal consolidation planned for 2012-2014 also resides, to 
the tune of almost 80%, on spending cuts, due above all to the adjustment of government 
consumption.
Any measure that increases the Spanish economy’s potential growth tends to be conducive 
to the fiscal adjustment. In particular, supply-side policies aimed at improving the workings 
of the markets for goods, services and factors may lead to an expansion in activity and in 
public revenue, and they may therefore help bring about public finances sustainability. 
Such complementarity comes about through several channels. The lowering of the obsta-
cles to competition and the improved efficiency in the workings of the markets for goods, 
services and labour have positive effects on productivity. For instance, it has been esti-
mated that an improvement in competition in the product market up to the level of the most 
competitive country might generate a 2.5% increase in productivity.15 In parallel are the 
spending cuts obtained as a result of greater economic activity. For example, the weight of 
unemployment benefits, which in Spain’s case amounted to 3% of GDP in 2010 compared 
with 1.9% on average for the euro area countries, would diminish. Finally, higher expected 
growth reduces public debt spreads. Thus, the short- and medium-term effects of a fiscal 
adjustment, when made separately and conducted along with structural reforms that 
heighten competition in the market for goods and services and increase labour market flex-
ibility, are very different (see Box 1.3 of Chapter 1 in this Report). Structural reforms, insofar 
as they lessen the distortions prevailing in labour and product markets, exert a significant 
positive effect on activity and public finances, mitigating the adverse effects of financial 
tensions and allowing greater room for manoeuvre for fiscal policy.
The economic literature shows that countries that have more demanding budgetary 
frameworks tend to evidence greater fiscal discipline. Further, the experiences of some of 
our neighbours showed that the most successful frameworks of fiscal rules are those that 
combine a budget deficit rule with explicit ceilings on public spending (see Box 2.1). In 
this respect, most EU countries have enhanced the quality of their fiscal frameworks, as 
a result above all of the application of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its exten-
sion to an additional set of national fiscal rules. Moreover, among the new features seek-
ing to reinforce fiscal discipline in the euro area, the reform of the SGP currently under 
discussion includes the need to properly develop these national fiscal frameworks and 
the application of a prudent public spending growth rule when assessing countries’ fiscal 
developments.
Spain has budgetary stability laws that set limits on the deficit that all levels of general govern-
ment, and public bodies, may incur. In particular, central, regional and local government and 
the Social Security system have to post a balanced budget or run a surplus over the course of 
the business cycle, in terms of financing capacity. However, only central government is sub-
ject to a ceiling on annual spending approved by Parliament before the budget is drawn up.
Parallel progress in structural 
reforms is crucial for the fiscal 
adjustment
4  The foundations of a 
fiscal stability 
programme for Spain
4.1  THE BUDGETARY 
FRAMEWORK AND FISCAL 
RULES
The institutional framework of 
budgetary policy in the European 
countries is being reconsidered, 
assigning greater importance to 
the rules that control the growth 
of public spending
In Spain, the budgetary stability 
legislation should be 
strengthened by extending a 
spending ceiling to all tiers of 
government. This ceiling should 
also be more accurately defined
15  On the effects of the regulation of goods and services markets and of labour market institutions on productivity, 
see, respectively, G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta (2006), “Regulation and Economic Performance: Product Market 
Reforms and Productivity in the OECD”, in T. Eicher and C. García-Peñalosa (eds.), Institutions, Development 
and Growth, MIT Press, and A. Basanini, L. Nunziata and D. Venn (2009), “Job protection legislation and pro-
ductivity growth in OECD countries”, Economic Policy, 24 (58), pp. 349-402.
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The experiences of some of our European peers (Denmark, Swe-
den, Finland and Switzerland) show that the most successful fiscal 
rule frameworks are those that combine a budget deficit rule with 
explicit public expenditure ceilings.1 Their usefulness lies in the 
fact that they are directed at the habitual source of budget deficits. 
Specifically, the ex-ante setting of a maximum amount of spend-
ing disciplines the drawing up of budgets for each unit of spend-
ing; these, therefore, have less room to exert upward pressure 
through individual demands. Further, the presence of a spending 
ceiling enables the rise in revenue in better-than-expected cyclical 
situations to be saved, ex post. Also, if the rule is well-defined and 
transparent, it provides for identification of the spending compo-
nents that generate the deviations. 
A spending rule is under discussion at the European level as part 
of the proposals to reform the SGP. According to the EC’s pro-
posal, its adoption would mean that, if a country failed to meet its 
medium-term fiscal target2, fiscal policy would only be qualified as 
prudent if the increase in spending were lower than the economy’s 
nominal potential growth, this being adjusted for discretionary 
measures on revenue.3
BOX 2.1PUBLIC SPENDING CEILINGS AS BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE MECHANISMS
1  See G. Ljungman (2008), Expenditure Ceilings – A Survey, IMF Working 
Paper no. 282.
2  The medium-term objective of the SGP is defined individually for each 
country; but generally, it requires that countries attain and maintain a 
structural public balance that is in equilibrium. 
3  This means that spending growth might exceed the economy’s poten-
tial growth if a fiscal reform that is to increase revenue is anticipated 
(and the opposite in the case of a tax cut). The extra permitted spend-
ing growth above potential will be equal to the amount of revenue 
raised by the tax increase.
Countries
Actual average 
growth in nominal 
primary spending 
(1998-2007)
Average growth
of potential
real GDP (c)
Average maximum 
growth in nominal 
primary spending 
compatible with
the spending rule
(1998-2007) (d)
Number of years
with actual spending 
growth above the 
spending rule (e)
Actual general 
government 
budget balance 
in 2007
General government balance 
that would have been posted 
in 2007 had spending been 
compatible with the 
spending rule (f)
Belgium 4.5 2.4 3.6 7.0 -0.4 3.4
Germany 1.5 1.7 2.4 3.0 0.3 -3.5
Estonia 12.5 6.1 11.7 7.0 2.5 4.9
Ireland 11.6 5.5 7.5 7.0 0.0 11.2
Greece 9.3 2.9 6.5 9.0 -6.7 3.0
Spain 7.8 3.0 5.9 8.0 1.9 8.2
France 3.9 2.2 3.0 7.0 -2.7 1.2
Italy 4.4 1.9 3.6 7.0 -1.5 1.8
Cyprus 9.4 4.3 7.6 7.0 3.4 9.3
Luxembourg 7.2 4.0 6.6 6.0 3.7 5.7
Malta 4.7 2.2 4.0 5.0 -2.3 -0.2
Netherlands 5.5 1.7 4.6 6.0 0.2 3.4
Austria 3.2 2.2 2.7 6.0 -0.6 1.3
Portugal 6.4 1.9 5.3 7.0 -2.8 1.1
Slovenia 9.5 3.7 9.1 7.0 0.0 1.8
Slovak Republic 6.9 4.6 8.6 6.0 -1.8 -8.3
Finland 4.0 2.7 3.1 7.0 5.2 9.1
EX POST SIMULATION FOR THE 1998-2007 PERIOD OF THE APPLICATION OF A SPENDING RULE SIMILAR TO THAT PROPOSED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (a) (b)  
SOURCES: European Commission and Banco de España.
a The simulation is performed year by year, although columns 1, 2 and 3 show average growth.
b According to the National Accounts information available in December 2010.
c Average potential growth for the period 2004-2010 according to the report "The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU25 Member 
States", Report of the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission (2006). 
d The simulated spending rule is dejned as a ceiling on annual nominal primary expenditure growth equivalent to the sum of potential real GDP growth and the 
actual growth of the GDP dekator, adjusted by the existence of discretionary tax measures. Moreover, if the country has not in the year under analysis attained 
the medium-term jscal objective, according to the EC's available estimates as at December 2010 of the cyclical adjusted balance corrected by the effect of the 
rule, the maximum ceiling on spending growth is reduced by 1%.    
e The column indicates the number of years in which actual spending was higher than the maximum ceiling in the period running from 1998 to 2007. 
f The budget balance that would have been obtained in 2007 if the estimated maximum spending ceiling had been observed in each year of the period.
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The accompanying table illustrates the workings of a rule of this 
type.4 Specifically, it shows the budget balance that the euro area 
countries would have obtained in 2007 had a similar rule to that 
proposed by the EC been applied each year over the 1997-2007 
period. To do this, the fiscal data for 1997 are taken as the starting 
point and, if a country has not reached the medium-term fiscal 
target set by the SGP, primary public spending growth is set at 1 
pp below the economy’s nominal potential growth.5 In this exer-
cise, once the country attains the medium-term target, the in-
crease in primary spending equals the economy’s nominal poten-
tial growth.6 it can be verified that strict compliance with this rule 
would have led to a much healthier situation in most of the coun-
tries during the decade prior to the economic crisis. Indeed, Ger-
many is the only country in which its application would not have 
led to an improved fiscal situation, given that in the period ana-
lysed, it posted average primary expenditure growth of 1.5%, al-
most 1 pp below that required by the rule (2.4%). In Spain, the 
application of such a rule would have provided for saving on the 
extraordinary revenue arising from the real estate expansion, and 
it would have allowed a fiscal surplus in 2007 almost 6 pp of GDP 
higher than actually observed. This is the outcome of the fact that 
average primary spending growth for the period was significantly 
higher in Spain than that deriving from the application of the rule 
(7.8%, compared with 5.9%, respectively).
Defining a spending rule is not, however, free from difficulties. 
Firstly, a variable allowing the permitted spending growth to be 
anchored must be chosen. If the starting point is a balanced budg-
et and, given that public revenue evidences approximately unit 
elasticity with respect to the economy’s nominal GDP, the spend-
ing ceiling should be set on the basis of the growth of this variable. 
Evidently, if the starting point is a budget deficit, the return to a 
balanced budget will require spending growth below nominal 
growth until such equilibrium is attained. To prevent the change in 
public spending from being pro-cyclical, nominal GDP should be 
replaced by the economy’s potential nominal GDP. In this way, in 
an economic upturn, characterised by GDP growth above poten-
tial, public spending should grow below actual GDP growth, while 
the opposite will occur in recessions. In any event, it should be 
stressed that the economy’s potential growth is not an observable 
variable and its estimation is controversial. As a result, with a view 
to its application in the spending rule, a prudent estimate of poten-
tial output must be recommended.
Potential GDP growth is normally estimated only in real terms; ac-
cordingly, the definition of the nominal component is additionally 
required. In this connection, resort can be had to using the annual 
growth of the GDP deflator. However, if spending growth is allowed 
to accommodate any increase in the deflator, this might enable 
very high increases in spending as a result of the existence of like-
wise very high inflation. To avoid this problem, one option is to set 
a ceiling on the increase in the deflator incorporated into the rule 
(e.g. that compatible with the ECB’s definition of price stability).
The rule should make explicit the spending components subject to 
it. On occasions, so as to prevent the ceiling from entailing a re-
duction in productive spending, the exclusion of investment 
spending has been proposed. Nonetheless, this rule is more diffi-
cult to oversee and easier to circumvent, since in practice the dis-
tinction between current and investment expenditure is not clear. 
In this respect, both the United Kingdom and Germany have re-
cently abandoned this type of golden rule. The national fiscal rules 
in place often exclude interest payments.7 Finally, it is occasion-
ally proposed that spending on unemployment benefits be exclud-
ed from the rule, so as to avoid, once again, a procyclical bias. 
However, it is argued that its exclusion adds complexity to the rule 
and may leave out increases in spending arising from a structural 
rise in unemployment, which will not be corrected by the cyclical 
trend.
The spending rules should also make explicit the correction mech-
anism for potential deviations that may arise, in which connection 
their fit in the multi-year budgeting horizon may prove particularly 
appropriate.
In sum, spending rules have proven to be a very useful instrument 
for ensuring fiscal discipline, but their definition can greatly condi-
tion their effectiveness. Broadly, to maximise their effectiveness, 
they should: cover all public spending, including fiscal expenses; 
be applicable to all tiers of government; be part of a medium-term 
budgetary framework; be subject to a deviation-correction mech-
anism; and be anchored in prudent estimates of the economy’s 
potential growth and inflation.
BOX 2.1PUBLIC SPENDING CEILINGS AS BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE MECHANISMS (cont’d)
4  See L. Fernández-Caballero, P. Hernández de Cos and J. Pérez García 
(2011), El marco de reglas fiscales en España, mimeo.
5  Each country’s potential growth is calculated as the sum of potential real 
GDP growth according to the European Union’s Economic Policy Com-
mittee’s 2006 estimates for the period 2004-2008 plus the GDP deflator 
observed for each year.
6  In keeping with footnote 3, the spending ceiling is raised/lowered by the 
estimated amount of the discretionary tax measures each year.
7  Set against growing public indebtedness as at present, this exclusion 
may give rise to a lower level of fiscal effort, or the opposite would occur 
in a situation of diminishing public debt/GDP ratios.
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Given the effectiveness of these limits on spending growth - which have enabled the 
State’s budgetary deviations to be reduced, setting aside the exceptional period of eco-
nomic crisis16 - and, above all, the decentralised nature of public spending in Spain, this 
type of rule should be extended to regional and local government, in particular to the for-
mer, where spending overruns compared with budget projections have been systematic 
and exceeded 3% per annum between 1984 and 2007. Further, even in the case of the 
ceiling on State spending, its definition may be better defined so that it is not only in terms 
of budgetary accounting, but also in National Accounts terms, and that it is anchored in a 
macroeconomic indicator, such as the trend growth of nominal GDP.
In this respect, Spain’s recently updated Stability Programme commits to including a 
spending rule in the Budgetary Stability Law, of similar characteristics to the European 
Commission’s recent proposal (see Box 2.1). Under this rule, budgeted and actual general 
government spending may not exceed the medium-term reference growth rate of the 
Spanish economy. Moreover, spending may only exceed that set under this rule if perma-
nent revenue-increasing measures are adopted; in turn, regulatory changes entailing per-
manent losses in revenue will automatically lead to a downward revision of the spending 
threshold. The spending rule will be directly applicable to central and local government, 
and the government will pursue its adoption by the regional governments.17
The fiscal rules should include appropriate mechanisms to enforce their application or, in 
the event of a breach, to correct this. In Spain’s case, the Stability Law allows deviations 
from the limits set whereby, if they arise, the level of government responsible is obliged to 
submit a plan for their correction, which in the case of the regional governments should be 
approved by the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council. It is further established that, if as a 
result of this breach Spain is sanctioned under the SGP, the level of government responsi-
ble will pay the commensurate portion of the sanction. In addition, the Stability Law allows 
central government to make authorisations for the issuance of regional government public 
debt conditional upon compliance with these objectives. Such conditionality is, in fact, 
that which has been applied over the past year, and its use should be viewed most favour-
ably, despite it not being automatically applicable. In this respect, it should be recalled that 
greater automaticity in the setting of specific sanctions is one of the aims of the reform of 
the Stability Pact. Under Spanish legislation there is, however, no possibility of establish-
ing sanctions, beyond those mentioned arising from non-compliance with the SGP. Look-
ing ahead, such a possibility might be considered as an additional disciplining mechanism, 
although the evidence shows that it is not easy to define these in a way that makes their 
application effective.
Another key element of fiscal rules is transparency, as acknowledged in the Budgetary 
Stability Law. Accordingly, although the dissemination of data on State activity is abun-
dant, detailed and with relatively short lags, this was not the case for most regional and 
local governments until recently. That limited the ability to exert timely control over their 
activity and accountability, and it is particularly dangerous at times such as the present, 
when a lack of information might result in a lack of market confidence.18
Moreover, the mechanisms for 
enforcing the rules should be 
strengthened...
... and the transparency of 
public finances should be 
increased, especially at the 
regional and local government 
level
16  See T. Leal and J. Pérez (2009), Análisis de las desviaciones presupuestarias aplicado al caso del presupuesto 
del Estado, Documentos de Trabajo, no. 0933, Banco de España.
17  Moreover, the Stability Programme, in line with the proposed reform of the Stability Pact (which seeks to set 
greater store by public debt in the European fiscal surveillance procedure), mentions that stricter rules will be 
set for indebtedness, extending the monitoring thereof. This will refer not only to compliance with the rules on 
debt as defined in the Excessive Deficit Protocol, but also to other financial liabilities.
18  See T. Leal, D. Pedregal and J.J. Pérez “Short-term monitoring of the Spanish government balance”, SERIEs-
Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 2, pp. 97-119.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 57 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 2. THE FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR SPAIN AFTER THE CRISIS
To redress these shortcomings, in late 2010 the government began to publish information 
on the regional governments’ budget outturn, individually and overall, on a quarterly basis 
(see Table 2.2). In any event, the regular publication of the budget outturn of regional gov-
ernments as a whole, and on an individual basis, with the same periodicity, degree of de-
tail, lag and accessibility as the State outturn, would be welcome. It would also be desir-
able to have some information, perhaps of a more aggregated nature, for the main cities, 
given their relative size compared with most of the regions. The latest Eurostat proposals 
to strengthen the Stability Pact statistically are, indeed, geared to increasing transparency.
Medium-term budgetary planning, necessitating the regular analysis of the structural dy-
namics of the various public revenue and spending captions and enabling those areas 
where room for rationalisation and adjustment is greater to be identified, may prove par-
ticularly appropriate when adjustment measures going beyond a temporary correction of 
imbalances are required. Indeed, the application of binding budgetary frameworks span-
ning several years is indicated in the literature as a positive factor in the application of 
fiscal adjustment plans, with the Netherlands a successful case in point in this connection.
In some cases, the full or partial delegation of fiscal policy decisions to an independent 
agency has also been discussed recently at the international level as a means of increas-
ing discipline, although the attendant design and effectiveness of such a mechanism is not 
free from controversy (see Box 2.2).
In a highly decentralised system such as Spain’s, achieving fiscal discipline comes up 
against the traditional problems of inter-government coordination. In this respect, in addi-
tion to extending fiscal rules to the lower tiers of government, the Stability Law includes a 
clause that establishes that the State shall not be responsible for financing the deficits or 
public debt of the lower levels of government.19 This clause seeks to prevent the cost of 
inappropriate fiscal behaviour in one region from passing through to the rest or to central 
government, and its presence enables the capital markets to continue to exert a significant 
disciplining effect on the basis of distinguishing between the risk premia on the debt of the 
different governments.
In addition, achieving fiscal discipline also depends on some correspondence between 
the level of accountability governing regions’ spending and their fiscal autonomy (fiscal 
co-responsibility), this being understood as the ability of the regions to generate reve-
nue to fund such spending. Without this autonomy, the regions depend excessively on 
inter-governmental transfers, distorting the relationship that should exist between taxa-
tion and public spending. That makes it more unlikely that citizens will penalise the 
undisciplined behaviour of the authorities, the appearance being that regional spending 
is funded, at least in part, by non-residents in the region. Indeed, the empirical literature 
finds a positive relationship between the level of transfers received by the regions and 
their levels of public spending and budget deficit.20 In Spain, although there has been a 
gradual increase in fiscal co-responsibility, this has only reached a scale and, above all, 
acquired significant characteristics in the latest financing arrangements: in these, the 
State guarantees on revenue growth were eliminated, the weight of tax receipts as a 
Greater importance should be 
given to medium-term 
budgetary planning 
For fiscal discipline, defining 
an appropriate framework for 
local and regional government 
is vital
19  Specifically, the Single Additional Provision of the Budgetary Stability Law states that “the State shall not as-
sume nor be accountable for the commitments of the regional governments, the local governments and the 
bodies linked or reporting to them,...”.
20  For the case of Spain, see I. Argimón and P. Hernández de Cos (2011), “Fiscal Rules and Federalism as Deter-
minants of Budget Performance: an Empirical Investigation for the Spanish Case”, Public Finance Review, 3 
February.
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Coverage Frequency Publication lag First year available
Accounting
framework
STATE
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly (a)
Approximately  
one month
Cash basis: Jan 1988
Nat. Acc.: Jan 1995
Nat. Acc.,
Cash basis
SOCIAL SECURITY
Social Security System
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly (a)
Approximately 
one month
Cash basis
National Public Employment Service
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly (a)
Approximately 
one month
January 1984 (b) Cash basis
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly Two months 2010 Q4 Budget
Other regularly published data (c):
Andalusia
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately  
one month
2008 Cash basis
Aragon —  —  —  —  —  
Asturias —  —  —  —  —  
Balearic Islands —  —  —  —  —  
Canary Islands
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
one month
1990 Cash basis
Cantabria
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly
Approximately  
one month
2006 (half-yearly from 
2001 to 2005)
Cash basis
Castile-La Mancha
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly 1999 Cash basis
Castile-León
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly
Approximately  
one month
November 2009 
(quarterly from 1991)
Cash basis
Catalonia
Revenue and
expenditure
Monthly
Approximately  
twomonths
2007 Cash basis
Extremadura —  —  —  —  —  
Galicia
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
four months
2002 Q1 Cash basis
La Rioja —  —  —  —  —  
Madrid Expenditure Monthly
Approximately 
two months
Cash basis
Murcia —  —  —  —  —  
Navarre —  —  —  —  —  
Basque Country
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
two months
2004 Q2 (annual from 
2000)
Cash basis
Valencian Community
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
Revenue and
expenditure
Quarterly
Approximately 
three months
2000 Nat. Acc.
Since December 2010 the budget outturn jgures have been published uniformly on a quarterly basis 
for the regional governments, in aggregate form and individually.
AVAILABILITY ON THE INTERNET OF INFORMATION FOR THE YEAR AS AT DECEMBER 2010 ON THE BUDGET 
OUTTURN FOR GENERAL GOVERNMENT, THE STATE, THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
TABLE 2.2
SOURCES: IGAE, Administración de la Seguridad Social, Economics and Statistics .Ejces and .Ejcial Gazettes of each of the regional governments. 
a The publication of the December jgure for the State, Social Security System and National Public Employment Service has a lag of over one month.  
b The Social Security System and National Public Employment Service jgures prior to this date were published quarterly. 
c Search made on public services as at 10 December 2010. The sources consulted were the websites of the  Economics and StatisticR.Ejces and .Ejcial Gazettes 
of each of the regional governments.  
d Initial publications on the Canary Islands budget outturn only included revenue. 
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In the ongoing reform of euro area economic governance rules and 
institutions, changes to the institutional framework for fiscal policy 
decisions are a priority. In this respect, two recommendations cur-
rently under consideration1 are to reinforce the independence of 
European fiscal policy supervision, through the creation of an in-
dependent European fiscal agency under the control of the Euro-
group, and to broaden national fiscal frameworks through the 
creation of independent budget offices or fiscal oversight agen-
cies in all the member countries.
The taxonomy of these independent fiscal agencies distinguishes 
two main types.2 First, there are fiscal councils with an analytical or 
forecasting role, which act as reference points, counterweights or 
guarantors of orthodox fiscal policy conduct and of compliance 
with the existing fiscal rules. Second, there are independent fiscal 
authorities which can influence budget balance directly by control-
ling some operational fiscal policy instrument.
The main theoretical reason for delegating a public decision to an 
independent authority is the existence of time inconsistency, i.e. a 
situation where short-term decisions are taken without consider-
ing their long-term consequences. In the case of monetary policy, 
inflation bias can be reduced by delegating control of operational 
monetary tools to an independent central bank with a clear price 
stability objective.
In the case of fiscal policy there may be a deficit bias, especially in 
the context of a monetary union3, but the delegation of fiscal instru-
ments is less common, given the limited consensus regarding the 
optimal levels of public spending and revenue. However, an exam-
ple of delegation of fiscal levers to non-government authorities oc-
curs in the management of sovereign wealth funds. In democratic 
countries, these funds are used to smooth public spending and 
taxes over time, and they are governed by a framework similar to 
the delegation of monetary policy, as summarised in the IMF’s 
“Santiago Principles”.4 Under these principles, sovereign funds 
should have a mandate that defines their objectives and confers 
them operational independence from the Finance Ministry, subject 
to rules of transparency in their conduct. Further, central banks 
usually act as guarantors of the independence of sovereign funds: 
for instance, a division of the Norgesbank manages the Norwegian 
funds, while the Central Bank of Chile appoints the management 
committees of the Chilean funds.
In the euro area, the role of the European Commission in the ap-
plication of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) can be seen as an 
example of delegation of fiscal responsibilities to a supranational 
agency. Nonetheless, the operation of the SGP has been compli-
cated by a lack of effective tools to ensure fiscal discipline ex ante, 
as opposed to sanctioning indiscipline ex post; moreover, the em-
pirical evidence suggests that an independent fiscal agency should 
be a national body, given the importance of specific knowledge of 
domestic fiscal conditions. Consistent with these arguments, many 
economists have proposed designs for possible independent fiscal 
authorities that would be mandated to ensure budget balance, and 
would be delegated effective operational control of some fiscal in-
struments to achieve this. Proposed instruments include changing 
VAT or income tax rates, without Parliamentary intervention, when 
budgetary or economic circumstances so require, or imposing 
across-the-board spending cuts if legislators approve a budget in-
consistent with the mandated deficit level.5
However, in practice most independent fiscal bodies today take 
the form of advisory councils. Their mandates range from the 
preparation of budgetary and macroeconomic forecasts to the 
evaluation of government policy proposals. Historical evidence 
suggests that these councils may reduce deficit bias if they inter-
vene directly in the budgetary process with their own normative 
recommendations, and that they can reinforce the impact of fiscal 
rules, laws or objectives.6 Examples come from the United States, 
where Congressional Budget Office forecasts were used to calcu-
late the fiscal adjustments needed to offset new spending pro-
grammes; from the Netherlands, where party platforms are based 
on the macroeconomic forecasts of the fiscal council, which also 
evaluates the fiscal agreements of coalition governments; and 
also from Chile, where two mutually independent panels monitor 
the maintenance of a structural surplus of 1% of GDP over the 
economic cycle. Another relevant role played by some independ-
ent fiscal agencies is to act as a neutral referee between central 
and regional governments, as stipulated, for example, by a recent 
reform in Australia.7
In Spain’s case, one new institutional feature this year is the estab-
lishment of the OPCG (Parliamentary Budgetary Office)8, which is 
intended as an advisory body for Parliament, designed to monitor 
and verify budget implementation. The specific role of the OPCG 
has still to be defined in detail.
BOX 2.2THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FISCAL POLICY
5  See J. Von Hagen and I. Harden (1995), “Budget processes and commit-
ment to fiscal discipline”, European Economic Review, 39, pp. 771-779; 
S. Wren-Lewis (2002), Fiscal policy, inflation, and stabilisation in EMU, 
mimeo, University of Exeter; L. Calmfors (2003), “Fiscal policy to stabi-
lise the domestic economy in the EMU: what can we learn from mone-
tary policy?”, CESifo Economic Studies, 49 (3), pp. 319-353, and C. 
Wyplosz (2005), “Fiscal policy: institutions versus rules”, National Insti-
tute Economic Review, 191, pp. 70-84.
6  See Debrun et al. (2009), op. cit., and Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011), 
op. cit.
7  Council of Australian Governments (2010), Charter, “COAG Reform 
Council”, 30 June 2010.
8  Law 37/2010 of 15 November 2010 on the creation of the Parliamentary 
Budgetary Office.
1  ECB (2010), “Reinforcing Economic Governance in the Euro Area”, June.
2  See X. Debrun, D. Hauner and M. Kumar (2009), “Independent fiscal 
agencies”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 23 (1), pp. 48-81, and L. Calm-
fors and S. Wren-Lewis (2011), What should fiscal councils do?, CESifo 
WP3382.
3  See A. Velasco (1999), “A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and De-
layed Fiscal Reforms”, in J. Poterba and J. Von Hagen (eds.), Fiscal In-
stitutions and Fiscal Performance, University of Chicago Press, and R. 
Beetsma and R. Bovenberg (1999), “Does monetary unification lead to 
excessive debt accumulation?”, Journal of Public Economics ,74, pp. 
299-325.
4  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (2008), Gener-
ally Accepted Principles and Practices, October.
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proportion of total regional government revenue increased, with the dependence on 
State transfers diminishing, and regulatory powers over taxation were increased (see 
Table 2.3).
However, some elements have still to be resolved. The first arises from the lack of stability 
of the system, which has given rise to high incentives for the regional governments to 
promote negotiation processes as a means of increasing the volume of financing acquired. 
Also contributing to this instability of the financing agreements is the complexity of the 
arrangements, which hampers anticipating how they may unfold over time and, indeed, 
setting a specific annual amount, which only depends on actual tax receipts with a time 
lag. The second element, associated with the first, arises from the way in which the re-
gional governments’ guaranteed spending is determined, since in negotiations it has al-
TAXES TRANSFERRED (percentages transferred under previous arrangements in brackets) % transferred
Normative 
capacity
DIRECT TAXES
    Personal income tax 50 (33) Yes
    Estate duties 100 (100) Yes
INDIRECT TAXES
    VAT 50 (35) No
    Manufacturing duties 58 (40) No
    Retail sales of hydrocarbons 100 (100) Yes
    Electricity 100 (100) No
    Transfer tax and stamp tax 100 (100) Yes
    Car registration 100 (100) Yes
    Gaming tax 100 (100) Yes
GUARANTEE FUND
SUFFICIENCY FUND
    In future years, the Fund changes according to the ITE (a).
REGIONAL CONVERGENCE FUNDS
    In future years both funds will change in step with the ITE (a).
    The Competitiveness Fund is annually distributed among the regional governments on the basis of adjusted per capita jnancing below  
    the average or below their jscal capacity, on the basis of their relative adjusted population.
    The Competitiveness Fund is annually distributed among the regional governments whose per capita GDP is below 90% of the average, 
    whose population density is less than 50% of average density or, given population growth that is lower than 90% of the average, whose 
    population density per square kilometre is lower than the jgure resulting from multiplying the average density of the ordinary-regime 
    regional governments by 1.25.
    Amount in base year: the regional governments contribute 75% of taxes transferred in normative terms and the State contributes an 
    amount of around 0.8% of GDP.
    The Fund is distributed by regional government on the basis of adjusted population (population 30%, equivalent protected population  
    38%, population over 65 8.5%, population 16 and under 20.5%, surface area 1.8%, dispersion 0.6%, island status 0.6%).
    In future years the regional government contribution changes in step with tax takings, the State contribution according to the ITE (a) and 
    the adjusted population is re-calculated year by year.
    Amount in base year: net borrowing of each regional government (including share in the additional State contribution to the system,  
    around 0.7% of GDP), less jnancing by taxes transferred in normative terms and less net share in the Guarantee Fund.
    Two new funds are created: the Competitiveness Fund (0.2% of GDP in the base year) and the Cooperation Fund (0.1% of GDP in 
    the base year).
MAIN FEATURES OF THE NEW FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ORDINARY-REGIME REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
TABLE 2.3
  
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The ITE comprises State takings for the year (excluding tax resources transferred to the regional governments), personal income tax, VAT and excise duties on 
beer, wine and fermented beverages, on intermediate products, on alcohol and derivative beverages, on hydrocarbons and on tobacco products. 
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ways been chosen to take the previous financing level as the base figure. That offers as-
surances to all the regional governments that, in the year taken as the base, they will see 
no decline in their resources. Looking ahead, it would be desirable, on one hand, to have 
a more stable financing system and, on the other, to use some objective method of calcu-
lating the regional governments’ actual spending needs. Such a method would assess 
current effective spending, it would add greater objectivity to the system and it would 
eliminate the incentives to periodically reconsider agreements that take the previously at-
tained level of financing as their basis. 
Taking the long view, the key factor for fiscal sustainability in Spain and in other developed 
countries is the impact on public finances of population ageing, which will push both pen-
sions spending and health care and dependency spending upwards. Accordingly, ensur-
ing the long-term sustainability of public finances involves, first, reforming the pensions 
system. This reform is particularly appropriate in the short term, since significant positive 
effects in terms of confidence may ensue from it, whereas its repercussions on demand 
are very limited. And regard should be had to its positive influence on the economy’s po-
tential growth, via the increase in participation rates, in particular those of the oldest co-
horts.
Since the increase in spending is due essentially to the rise in life expectancy and to the 
subsequent impact on the dependency ratio, the sustainability of the system necessarily 
entails raising the retirement age, restricting early retirement and encouraging a longer 
working life. The same considerations, along with reasons relating to fairness and encour-
aging participation in the labour market, also advise moving towards the proportionality of 
contributions paid in throughout working life to the pension received, in which connection 
the number of years of contributions for the calculation of the amount of the pension (the 
regulatory base) must be raised significantly, which would bring us closer into line with 
other European countries (see Table 2.4).
The draft legislation on the reform of the public pension system submitted by the govern-
ment to Parliament in March 2011 marks progress in both directions, and on the projec-
tions available, it will bring about a significant saving on the increased expenditure envis-
aged (see Box 2.3).
The reform also includes a factor of sustainability as from 2027, which should be instru-
mental in the revision every five years of the fundamental parameters of the system in 
terms of the differences between the trend of life expectancy for the population at the age 
of 67 from the year 2027 to the year in which the revision is made. The prompt definition 
of this factor of sustainability and the bringing forward of its application from the envis-
aged date (2027) are particularly important, and should avoid successive rounds of nego-
tiations on the adaptation of the parameters, which are so difficult to agree on.
Some European countries have already introduced similar measures (see Table 2.4). In 
some (Finland, Italy and Portugal), the factor of sustainability depends on changes in life 
expectancy, whereas in Germany the deciding factor is the ratio of pensioners to work-
ers paying contributions. In the cases of Finland and Italy, it only affects the calculation 
of new pensions; in Germany’s case, meanwhile, the factor of sustainability affects new 
pensions and the way in which previous pensions are updated. In most cases, the ad-
justment of the social security system parameters is automatic, except in Austria, where 
changes in life expectancy are only taken as an indicator of the need to activate the 
adjustment.
4.2  PUBLIC SPENDING
To ensure fiscal stability, 
pensions reform is pivotal...
... and must act on the actual 
retirement age and on the 
commensurateness of 
contributions to pensions, as 
the recent draft reform 
proposes
The introduction of a factor of 
sustainability is particularly 
important...
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In March 2011, the government submitted to Parliament the draft 
law on the reform of the public pensions system, containing pro-
posals to amend some of its main parameters. Firstly, the retire-
ment age is to be generally raised to 67 (compared with 65 at 
present). The extension will be progressively applied in the period 
from 2013 to 2027, at a rate of one month per year up to 2018 and 
two months a year from 2019. However, workers who have con-
tributed to the system for 38 years and six months may continue 
to retire at the age of 65.
The reform also states that, from the age of 63, there is a possibil-
ity of taking early retirement provided 33 years’ contributions have 
been made. In each case an annual reduction factor of 7.5% for 
each year ahead of the new ordinary retirement age shall be ap-
plied, although in these cases no top-up to the minimum pension 
will be applicable. The only exception to this rule has it that the 
minimum age (63) may be reduced to 61 in crisis situations.
The second notable feature of the reform is the lengthening of the 
period used to calculate the amount of the pension (the “regula-
tory base”) from 15 to 25 years (immediately prior to retirement). 
This will be progressively phased in at a rate of one year per an-
num from 2013 to 2022. 37 years’ contributions will be necessary 
to qualify for 100% of the regulatory base of the pension, whereby 
the first 15 years of contributions will entitle pensioners to 50%, 
while the remaining 50% will be obtained proportionately between 
15 and 37 years’ contributions, the calculation being made month-
ly. In this case a transitional period has also been set, commencing 
in 2013 and concluding in 2027. It is further established that, in the 
event of gaps in contributions, those relating to the first 24 months 
shall be topped up with the minimum contribution base, and those 
exceeding 24 months, with 50% of the base. That is in contrast to 
the current legislation, where all gaps are supplemented with the 
minimum base.
The reform introduces a sustainability factor as from 2027, with 
the aim of maintaining the proportionality of contributions to ex-
pected system benefits. In this connection, every five years the 
system’s fundamental parameters will be revised on the basis of 
the differences observed between the population’s life expectancy 
at the age of 67 as at the year in which the revision is made and life 
expectancy at 67 in 2027, using to this end the projections made 
by the competent government agencies. Finally, under certain 
conditions, the reform enables women who have interrupted their 
working life to have a baby or to adopt to bring forward their retire-
ment age ahead of 67, by a proportion of nine months per child, 
for a maximum of two years. New incentives are also provided to 
prolong working life,
together with greater safeguards for university and vocational 
training programmes, so that the entities and companies funding 
such programmes will have to contribute to the Social Security 
system for programme beneficiaries.
As regards the potential impact of this reform, information from the 
MCVL (Continuous Survey of Working Life) shows that a signifi-
cant proportion of individuals retire at present having contributed 
for more than 38 years and six months. Under the new regulations, 
these individuals may continue to retire at 65 and, therefore, they 
would not be affected by the higher retirement age. In particular, 
since 1998 the percentage of individuals who have retired at the 
age of 65 or less and with years of contribution more than or equal 
to 39 years has held relatively stable at a figure close to 50%.
In terms of the breakdown by sex, this percentage is higher in the 
case of men (around 61%) than in that of women (20% in 2009). 
The percentage in the case of women can be seen to be on a 
mildly growing trend, rising from 12% in 1998 to 20% in 2009; ac-
cordingly, in the future, the increase in female participation might 
exert slight upward pressure on this percentage, raising the num-
ber of people who might take retirement at 65.
With regard to skills, the group of highly skilled workers evidences 
a slightly lower percentage than the rest, due possibly to the fact 
that a higher level of educational attainment is associated with 
entering the labour market at a later age. Looking ahead, insofar 
as this high-skills group continues to increase, there might be a 
reduction in the percentage of people who can take retirement at 
65.
In sum, no clear trends are apparent in changes in the percentage 
of individuals who, aged 65 or less, and with 39 years’ contribu-
tions or more, have retired in recent years. With a view to the fu-
ture, if these percentages hold, the increase in the legal age of re-
tirement by two years, from 65 to 67, would give rise to an impact 
of around 1.1 years on average on top of the actual retirement age. 
In any event, the increase in the female participation rate might 
drive this percentage upwards, while the presumed increase in the 
population’s level of educational attainment would have the op-
posite effect.
As to how the average pension will be affected by the increase in 
the number of years’ contributions taken into account in calculat-
ing the regulatory base and the new treatment accorded to gaps in 
contributions, information drawn from the MCVL can be used to 
estimate the impact that would arise from these changes had the 
new regulations (those corresponding to the final year of the tran-
sitional period, 2022) been applied to actual retirements in 2008. 
To do this, the regulatory bases of the generation that was born in 
1943 and which retired in 2008 are estimated. For this group it is 
obtained that the application of the reform would have brought 
about an average reduction in pensions of 4.7%. This reduction 
cannot, however, be taken as an estimate of the impact of the re-
form on future pensions since, among other matters, individuals 
might change their behaviour, increasing for instance their partici-
pation in the labour market, as a result of the reform.
Calibrating the long-term effects of such a far-reaching reform of 
the parameters of the pensions system is a complex task and one 
subject to the uncertainty of the many assumptions that must be 
made. Possible exercises include estimates with a general equilib-
rium model, calibrated for the Spanish economy, with overlapping 
BOX 2.3THE REFORM OF THE PENSIONS SYSTEM
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generations of economic agents that take optimal consumption, 
saving, work and investment decisions. These estimates are com-
parable with those made by the European Commission’s Econom-
ic Policy Committee, which show an increase in contributory pen-
sion spending of 6.3 pp of GDP between 2009 and 2060, insofar 
as they are based on the same population projections to 2060 
(those made by Eurostat and which are known under the name of 
EUROPOP 2008) and the same projection on total factor produc-
tivity, which is a determinant of the future course of GDP and, 
therefore, of the sustainability of the Social Security system.
Specifically, a simulation has been made of the impact on future 
pensions spending of the estimated increase in the effective retire-
ment age, the extension of the calculation period determining the 
regulatory base and the modification of the scale of percentages 
according to the number of years’ contributions. The results of the 
simulations show that the effect of these changes might entail a 
saving of around 40% on the projected increase in pensions 
spending relative to GDP from 2009 to 2060 (see accompanying 
table). Consequently, the reform is a major step towards easing 
the effects of population ageing. The results are in line with those 
estimated in other papers, including the government’s official esti-
mate. Moreover, these effects of the reform might become wider 
following the activation of the sustainability factor, which would 
contribute to reducing pensions spending further if its application 
were to infer new changes to the system’s parameters such as, for 
instance, increases in the number of years used to calculate the 
pension and/or the putting back of the effective retirement age. 
BOX 2.3THE REFORM OF THE PENSIONS SYSTEM (cont’d)
Some countries (Sweden, Italy and certain central and eastern European countries) have 
opted for more extensive reforms, such as the transition towards a system which, being 
unfunded, is based on the defined contribution principle. Under this principle, pensions are 
proportionate to the contributions made by each individual over the course of their working 
life, they are duly updated on the basis of demographic and economic developments, and 
they depend on their age at the time of retirement. This rule entails greater transparency in 
the calculation of pensions, which encourages labour participation, lengthens working life 
and, in this way, ultimately raises the ratio of pensions received to wages.
The estimates available presage a strong increase in health spending as a result of 
population ageing, of around 1.6 pp of GDP to 2060.21 An analysis of public spend-
...whereas, with a view to 
enhancing transparency and 
system incentives, it would be 
desirable to move towards the 
proportionality of contributions 
to pensions
The dynamics of health 
spending are also worrying...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The results show the saving from each reform expressed as a percentage of the envisaged increase in spending without reform.
b The estimates of Díaz-Saavedra et al. (2010) include (1) and (2), but not (3). In these, the increase in the simulated retirement age is 1.4 years. 
c In this model, the minimum frequency is annual. Accordingly, to approximate the estimated raising of the retirement age by 1.1 years, an increase of one year in 
the retirement age is simulated. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the total effect of the reforms, i.e. the sum of (1), (2) and (3), is not equal to individual 
sum of each reform, owing to the interactions between them.  
THE IMPACT OF THE REFORM ON FUTURE PENSION SPENDING. A COMPARISON OF EXISTING ESTIMATES (%)
Increase in the 
retirement age (1)
Lengthening of 
calculation period (2) 
Change in scale 
(3)
Total effect
(1) + (2) + (3)
Sustainability factor
2009-2050 period
    Government 15 15 8 38 15
    Díaz-Saavedra et al. (2010= (ƃret. 1.4 years) (b) — — — 38 —
    De la Fuente and Doménech (2011) — — — 40 —
    Banco de España model (ƃret. 1 year) (c) 14 26 11 43 —
2009-2060 period
    De la Fuente and Doménech (2011) — — — 39 —
    Banco de España model (ƃret. 1 year) (c) 7 22 10 37 —
21  See European Commission and CPE (2009), “The 2009 Ageing Report: economic and budgetary projections for 
the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060)”, European Economy, no. 2/2009.
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ing by function in the decade prior to the crisis reveals the strong growth of this 
item, with annual rates close to 9% between 1997 and 2007, and exceeding 20% of 
total public spending. A breakdown of the annual average growth of per capita 
health care spending shows, moreover, that the contribution of the non-demograph-
ic factors (associated, inter alia, with supply-side elements) is estimated to be very 
high; consequently, extrapolating past behaviour to the future, the increases in 
health spending in the long run might exceed those arising from the purely demo-
graphic effect.
RECENT REFORMS TO PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE EU-15
Reforms to system parameters
Calculation of pensions
Retirement 
age
Incentives to 
carry on 
working
Measure
Updating of 
contribution 
bases
Updating of 
the pension
Sustainability 
factor
Dejned 
contribution
Notional 
accounts
Germany X X X X
Austria X X X X
Belgium X X X
Denmark X X X
Spain (a) X
Finland X X X X X
France X X X X X
Greece X X
Netherlands
Ireland X
Italy X X X X X X
Luxembourg X
Portugal X X X X X X
United Kingdom X X X
Sweden X X X X
DESCRIPTION OF SUSTAINABILITY FACTORS IN PLACE IN EU-15 PENSION SYSTEMS
Germany
Denmark
Finland
France
Italy
Portugal
Sweden
Structural reforms
The amount of the pension depends directly on "transformation coeEjcients", which in turn depend on life expectancy. 
These shall be revised every ten years.
The amount of the pension will be adjusted according to the relationship between life expectancy at 65 in 2006 and life 
expectancy at that same age in the year immediately prior to retirement .
The amount of the pension will be adjusted on the basis of life expectancy as at the age at which retirement becomes 
effective, with no distinction by sex.
The degree of indexation of the pension to wage growth will be adjusted on the basis of the difference between the 
change in the number of contributors to the system and the increase in the number of pensioners. 
Increases in life expectancy at the age of 60 will translate as from from 2005 into the retirement age being put back so 
that the average number of years pension collection will remain set at 19.5 years. The new estimates, which will be 
updated every 5 years, will come into force 10 years after.
The amount of the pension is adjusted on the basis of the changes that arise in life expectancy as from 2010.
The reference period used to calculate the amount of the pension is adjusted on the basis of the the increases that 
arise in life expectancy at 60, so that the relationship between the reference period for the calculation of the pension 
and the number of expected years in retirement holds constant.  
PENSION SYSTEMS IN THE EU-15 TABLE 2.4 
 
  
SOURCES: CPE, European Commission and Banco de España.
a Measures forming part of the draft pension system reform submitted to Parliament by the government in March 2011 are not included.  
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The improved efficiency of health spending might provide for cost savings by bearing on certain 
regulatory factors22, including most notably price mechanisms (little used in Spain), the regula-
tion of supplier prices and a degree of competition in the provision of services (see Table 2.5).23
In Spain, the general government sector employed somewhat more than 15% of all wage-
earners in 2009, with total gross wages amounting to close to 20% of economy-wide 
employee compensation, on average, in the period 1999-2010. in terms of public spend-
ing, the significance of this variable is even greater, since it accounts for around 26% of the 
total. In the ongoing fiscal adjustment, and according to the latest Stability Programme 
Update, the contribution of the cut in this total gross wage bill between 2009 and 2014 
might account for around 30% of the total reduction in the budget deficit.
Employee compensation has played a dual role in other countries’ successful consolidation 
strategies, helping make the adjustment durable and reducing its effect on economic activ-
ity in the short term. The interaction between public- and private-sector wages is the main 
channel through which the cushioning or offsetting of the potential restrictive effect of the 
containment of public-sector employee compensation on GDP is instrumented. In the case 
of the Spanish economy, the evidence indicates that the multiplier effect on activity of a 
reduction in employee compensation is positive even in the short term.24 Using this relation-
ship between public- and private-sector wages may be particularly relevant in a context in 
which the growth of the economy requires significant gains in competitiveness. For this to 
be possible in the current circumstances, the reform of collective bargaining is vital.
In any event, it should be borne in mind that, when aggregate fiscal adjustment needs are con-
siderable, measures based on restricting public-sector total gross wages face certain limits, 
given their potential impact on the efficiency and sufficiency of services. In this respect, in terms 
... although gains in efficiency 
in this sector can be achieved
Public-sector employee 
compensation should play a 
key role in the fiscal 
adjustment...
Value of the indicator (a)
Spain Maximum in the OECD
Price regulation 5.30 5.90 0.011
Control of access to specialists 6.00 0.00 (c) -0.005
Control of objectives 2.80 5.70 0.009
Price mechanisms 1.30 3.10 0.020
Development of private coverage 3.00 6.00 0.003
Elasticity of changes in regulation 
on eEjciency (b)
HEALTH CARE SECTOR REGULATION INDICATORS AND ESTIMATE OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT 
OF REGULATORY CHANGES ON EFFICIENCY 
TABLE 2.5 
 
 
SOURCE: Hernández de Cos and Moral Benito (2011), drawing on OECD data. 
a All the indicators range from 0 (minimum) to 6 (maximum). 
b Obtained using the regression of an estimated level of eEjciency for each country on the basis of 20 health care policy indicators considered by the OECD. The 
table shows only indicators and their estimated elasticity in cases in which this is signijcant.  
c In the case of this indicator, given that estimated elasticity is negative, the value in the table is the minimum, not the maximum, in the OECD countries.
22  These results should be viewed with caution given that they do not always prove robust to the measure of 
health care spending efficiency used. See P. Hernández de Cos and E. Moral Benito (2011), Eficiencia y regu-
lación en el gasto sanitario en los países de la OCDE, mimeo.
23  Specific recent regulatory decisions by the government attempt to influence the reduction in prices and distri-
bution margins. For example, Ministerial Order SPI/3052/2010 of 26 November 2010, determining sets of drugs 
and their reference prices, and also regulating specific aspects of the reference price system, and Royal Decree 
8/2010 of 20 May 2010, adopting extraordinary measures for the reduction in the budget deficit (Chapter 5, 
health measures).
24  See F. De Castro and P. Hernández de Cos (2008), “The economic effects of fiscal policy: the case of Spain”, 
Journal of Macroeconomics, 30, pp.1005-1028.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 66 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 2. THE FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR SPAIN AFTER THE CRISIS
of restricting public-sector employment, consideration must be given to the fact that, according 
to the MAP (General Government Ministry), the main weight of public employment in Spain is 
concentrated in activities that are complementary to the private sector (Justice, Security Forces, 
general administration) or potentially substitutive of private activity, but which are considered 
basic public services (education and health, almost 45% of the total).25 The staff employed in 
public corporations account for less than 5% of total public-sector employment in Spain.
As regards compensation per employee, the estimates available show there is some lee-
way for the adjustment, given that significant positive wage differences are observed be-
tween compensation per employee in the public sector as opposed to the private sector, 
even when controlling for individual characteristics.26 These differences would be chiefly 
concentrated in the lower-skilled strata.
Turning to public investment, it should be borne in mind that the growth of non-residential 
public productive capital was close to 4.5% on average between 1994 and 2007, which 
allowed the gap between Spain and the other euro area countries in terms of the public 
capital/population ratio to be reduced by more than 20 pp to 85% of the average for the 
euro area at end-2009. Likewise, the public investment/GDP ratio in 2009 stood at 4.4% 
of GDP in Spain (2.8% on average in the euro area); accordingly, the weight of this variable 
could be reduced without harming the necessary process of convergence.27 The reduction 
in the European funds that were used in the past to fund a significant portion of this public 
investment also makes it necessary to rationalise future investment projects to some ex-
tent. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the positive effects of public invest-
ment on productivity appeared to arise only from specific components, such as infrastruc-
ture, and these may moreover be cut significantly as from certain thresholds.
The weight of some spending items, in particular other transfers and current payments, 
capital transfers and subsidies, is high, accounting in 2010 for almost 9% of total public 
... while public investment 
projects should be 
rationalised...
...as should public transfers 
and subsidies, whose weight 
in public spending is high
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COUNTRIES IN 2008 
CHART 2.5
SOURCE: Eurostat. 
25  For a classification of public-sector activities that are substitutive of or complementary to private activities, see 
R. Fiorito and T. Kollintzas (2004), “Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between private and government 
consumption”, European Economic Review, 48, pp. 1367-1398.
26  J. I. García-Pérez and J. F. Jimeno (2005), Public sector wage gaps in the Spanish regions, Documentos de 
Trabajo, no. 0526, Banco de España. See also R. Giordano and D. De Palo (2011), The public sector pay gap in 
selected euro area countries, mimeo, Banca d’Italia.
27  Moreover, it should be taken into account that much of the investment in infrastructure is by the corporate 
public sector or funded (at least in part) by the private sector.
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spending and around 4% of GDP. Currently, more than half the subsidies and transfers are 
aimed at public and private companies, which include most notably infrastructure and 
transport companies, along with those aimed at promoting employment and at interna-
tional cooperation. There would therefore be room for rationalisation in this field, on the 
basis of effectiveness criteria and bearing in mind the potential distortionary effects that 
this type of transfer generates. In this area, the latest Stability Programme Update consid-
ers significant reductions in this type of spending of around 1.8% of GDP in the 2014 
horizon.
The weight of spending on unemployment benefits rose to 3% of GDP in 2010, a signifi-
cantly higher level than the European average, as a result of Spain’s high unemployment 
rate. Conversely, active employment policies accounted in 2008 for only 0.6% of GDP, 
below the EU average (see Chart 2.5). This difference is even greater when analysed in 
terms of spending per unemployed person. The breakdown of spending on active policies 
shows, moreover, that almost 35% of active policy expenditure in Spain was earmarked 
for the concession of Social Security rebates (compared with 23% in the EU), while spend-
ing on training accounted for only 19% (36% in the EU).
Against a background of high unemployment levels, employment policies should be 
chiefly aimed at preventing this increase in joblessness from becoming structural. To 
do this, it should be borne in mind that the available empirical evidence shows that 
the effectiveness of Social Security rebates is very limited, whereas unemployment 
benefits have negative effects on unemployment exit rates, lengthening the duration 
of unemployment and increasing the likelihood of it becoming structural. In this re-
spect, active and passive employment policies should be reorganised and greater 
control maintained over effective job search by workers. Active policies should re-
duce the funds currently assigned to rebates, which should be confined to the groups 
facing most employability difficulties, in line with the reform approved in 2010. Also, 
these funds should be earmarked to a greater extent for training, with highly specific 
technical content.28
Lastly, employment policy 
should be reorganised, giving 
greater weight to the so-called 
“active policies”
28  See C. Alonso-Borrego, A. Arellano, J.J. Dolado and J.F. Jimeno (2004), Eficacia del gasto en algunas políticas 
activas en el mercado laboral español, Documento de Trabajo no. 53, Fundación Alternativas, Madrid.
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SOURCE: OECD (2011), Taxing Wages 2010, OECD Publishing.
a The average tax wedge on employment income for each standard individual is obtained as the sum of personal income tax derived from employment income plus 
social security contributions borne by the employer and the worker, on one hand, and the related gross average wage of private-sector full-time employees, on 
the other.   
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SOURCES: Taxation trends in the European Union - 2010 Edition (Eurostat)
a The data for Portugal and Greece are for 2006.
b The implied rates on consumption are calculated as the ratio of the sum of revenue from taxes on consumption (VAT, taxes on energy, taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol, and other taxes on specijc consumption) to household jnal consumption in national territory. The implied rates on labour are calculated as the sum of all 
direct taxes and social security contributions, paid both by wage-earners and employers, that are levied on employment income, divided by the total compensation 
of wage-earners who work in national territory.   
c The implied rates on jrms' capital are obtained as the ratio of all tax revenue arising from taxes levied on business income and on capital, on one hand, to the sum 
of jrms' net operating surplus, interest, dividends and other net property income received, on the other. The implied rates on households' capital are calculated as 
the ratio of the sum of taxes on households' capital income and the returns on business activities, on one hand, to the sum of imputed income, the net operating 
surplus and households' and not-for-projt private institutions' mixed income, mixed income of the self-employed, and interest, dividends and other net property 
income received by households and not-for-projt private institutions. 
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Given the scale of the fiscal adjustment needed, having to introduce tax changes to 
accompany the foregoing spending cuts cannot be ruled out. Further, it should be 
taken into account that a significant portion of the fiscal deterioration has been due to 
the reduction in revenue, which will not foreseeably be reversed in the medium term 
to pre-crisis levels. These changes should take into consideration the role that the 
level and structure of taxation play in respect of the economy’s potential growth and 
competitiveness. Nor should it be forgotten that another function of tax systems is to 
contribute to the redistribution of income among the different agents. The change in 
the size and composition of public spending programmes should, therefore, be com-
plemented with tax reforms which, along with being compatible with the goals of fair-
ness that should be established, combine an increase in tax-raising capacity with 
improved efficiency.
In keeping with these criteria, when tax increases are necessary, they should be in the form 
of taxes that have fewer distortionary effects on growth and the allocation of resources. 
Examples of such taxes are those on real estate and on consumption. Currently, Spain’s 
lower tax pressure relative to other developed countries is due to the lower weight of those 
taxes considered less distortionary, in particular indirect taxes (see Charts 2.6 and 2.7). 
4.3  PUBLIC REVENUE
On the revenue side, 
measures could include 
increasing indirect taxation 
and reducing fiscal expenses
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SOURCES: 2010 State Budget (Report on tax benejts) and IGAE (National Audit .Ejce).
a Gross revenue is the sum of actual revenue and of jscal expenses.
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VAT rates, even after being raised in 2010, remain below the average for the OECD coun-
tries. Moreover, the ratio of VAT revenue to that which would be obtained were the stand-
ard rate to be applied to all consumer spending stands in Spain at 56%; accordingly, one 
option to increase revenue might be to broaden the base of the tax. Along the same lines, 
the weight of excise duties in general, and of environmental levies in particular, is signifi-
cantly lower than in other developed countries.
So-called “fiscal expenses”, arising from the presence of deductions and exemptions on 
different taxes, represent a major cost in terms of revenue-raising, they add complexity to 
the tax structure and in some cases they exert significant adverse effects on efficiency and 
even on fairness (see Chart 2.8). They should therefore be rationalised. Specifically, ac-
cording to information provided by the State budget on tax benefits, fiscal expenses in 
Spain account for around 42% of VAT revenue raised, for almost one-third of personal in-
come tax revenue and for one-fifth of corporate income tax revenue. The source of these 
fiscal expenses is highly diverse. In the case of VAT, the biggest portion arises from the 
application of low rates to specific goods, while under personal income tax, they are as-
sociated above all with exemptions/deductions on employment income, but also with the 
preferential treatment that investment in housing29 and contributions to pension schemes 
receive. Under corporate income tax, fiscal expenses correspond to various incentives in 
respect of investment, the promotion of SMEs and the development of R+D projects.
In sum, the fiscal policy priority in the coming years should be a vigorous adjustment that 
provides for public finances to be redressed swiftly and soundly. In parallel, the spending- 
and revenue-side measures ultimately adopted should strengthen the contribution of fiscal 
policy to the economy’s potential growth, which will require greater efficiency in public 
policy action.
In sum, public revenue and 
spending policies should 
urgently redress public 
finances and contribute to 
economic growth in the 
medium term
29  Here it should be recalled that the habitual dwelling deduction was eliminated for taxpayers exceeding a spe-
cific income threshold. In addition to this marking significant progress in tax neutrality between house-purchase 
versus house-rental decisions, it will also entail a gradual reduction in the current fiscal spending derived from 
this personal income tax deduction.
